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Abstract 
Regardless of the method for pricing, many studies both in developed and emerging 
markets show that the IPOs are underpriced. This first anomaly in the IPO markets has 
puzzled researchers since 1970s and there is a huge amount of studies on this subject. 
Another anomaly in the IPO market is generally defined as the “hot issue” markets implies 
that there are cycles in terms of volume and number. The third anomaly in the IPO markets 
is known as the long run underperformance. Long run underperformance is usually proven 
by using 3 years cumulative market adjusted returns after the IPO. But some studies 
indicate that the long run underperformance can go up to six years. Why do the IPOs 
systematically underperform the market? Although there are some other theories for the 
long run underperformance, one of the most important one indicates that the initial pricing of 
the IPO causes this anomaly. So, the first anomaly is a part of the answer of the third one or 
in other words the factors behind the performance of the future periods may lie back to the 
IPO process 3 or more years ago.  
This study mainly focuses on the anomalies especially the first and the third ones in the IPO 
markets. After reviewing the literature about the anomalies mentioned above there is an 
empirical study for the Istanbul Stock Exchange to determine the validity of these anomalies 
in Turkey and the factors behind them.  
In parallel to the literature, raw return, adjusted return, cumulative return, WR values, 
indexing and regression analysis were used in the study. Findings prove that both 
underpricing and long run underperformance anomalies exist in ISE. Especially market 
conditions, number of investors, IPO offering rate, in some cases sals method were found as 
statistically important factors for underpricing in the ISE. Another important finding is that 
underpricing causes long run underperformance.  
 
Özet 
İlk halka arzlarda, gerek gelişmiş gerekse gelişmekte olan piyasalara ilişkin yapılan 
çalışmalarda düşük fiyatlama anomalisi gözlenmektedir. Halka arz piyasalarına ilişkin ilk 
anomali olan düşük fiyatlamayla ilgili 1970’lerden başlayan çok geniş bir literatür oluşmuştur.  
Halka arz piyasalarına ilişkin ikinci anomali gerek sayı olarak gerekse hacim olarak bu 
piyasalarda dönemsellik bulunmasıdır. 
Üçüncü anomali ise halka arzların uzun dönem düşük performansı olarak adlandırılmaktadır. 
Uzun dönem performans genellikle 3 yıllık birikimli piyasaya göre düzeltilmiş getiriler baz 
alınarak ölçülmektedir. Bazı çalışmalar uzun dönem düşük performansın halka arzdan 
sonraki altıncı yılda dahi devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Bu anomaliyi açıklamaya yönelik 
farklı teoriler olmakla birlikte düşük performansın nedenlerinin halka arza bağlı olduğuna 
yönelik teoriler bulunmaktadır. Bir başka ifadeyle “uzun dönem düşük performans” 
anomalisine kısmen düşük fiyatlama anomalisi neden olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bugün için 
düşük performans gösteren bir şirketin bu performansının nedenlerinden bazıları üç veya 
daha fazla yıl öncesindeki halka arz sürecinde aranabilir. 
Bu çalışmada konuyla ilgili literature araştırmasının yapılarak söz konusu anomalilerden 
özellikle halka arzlarda düşük fiyatlama ve uzun dönem düşük performans anomalilerinin 
İMKB için varlığı araştırılarak nedenleri tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. 
Konuyla ilgili literatüre benzer şekilde, basit getiriler, log getiri, düzeltilmiş getiri, kümülatif 
getiri, WR değerleri, endeksleme ve regresyon analizi kullanılan temel yöntemlerdir. Bulgular 
İMKB’de düşük fiyatlama ve uzun dönem düşük performans anomalilerinin mevcut olduğunu 
göstermektedir. Farklı modeller kullanılmış olmasına karşılık genelikle piyasa koşulları, 
yatırımcı sayısı, halka arz oranı, bazı durumlarda satış yöntemi istatistiki olarak nu 
anomalileri kısmen açıklayana değişkenler olarak tespit edilmiştir. Bir diğer önemli sonuç 
düşük fiyatlamanın aynı zamanda uzun dönem düşük performansa neden olmasıdır.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The macro economic view suggests that the aim of the corporations or 
firms is profit maximization. As the capital markets get more efficient, the 
aim of both the corporate owners and the shareholders get closer. In 
perfect markets where it is possible to invest in financial instruments with 
minimum trading costs, it is assumed that the investors invest in the firms 
with the incentive to maximize their welfare.   
The firms can provide the finance that they need for achieving their goals 
and continue their activities from internal and external sources. Especially 
in the early stages of the establishment process, the internal sources play 
an important role. However in the growth period, as the internal sources are 
scarce, firms need more external capital sources. If there are not venture 
capitalists or investment angels as in the case of most emerging markets, 
there are limited instruments for the new firms that have a high growth 
potential to find funds. One way is to get finance through debt instruments 
(credit institutions or bond offering), and the other way is the public offering. 
Generally, firms provide short term funds through credits and long term 
financial needs through capital markets by issuing bonds or shares. Stock 
exchanges play a vital role in the financial system by constructing a 
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balance between the fund supply and demand, allocating the funds 
efficiently in terms of quantity and maturity. 
Especially in emerging countries where the public sector borrowing 
requirement is high, due to the crowding out effect, the interest rates are 
high. As a result, the credit interest rates and the cost of funds by credits 
are high. Besides, the crowding out effect prevents the firms to raise funds 
through bills and bonds offerings. Also the policy of high interest rate and 
low currency to attract the foreign investors increases the cost of finance.  
As an alternative source of finance, firms can go public. When a firm 
decides to go public, the pricing problem occurs. Pricing of an IPO is 
important for all related parties namely the firm, investors, employers, 
underwriters. In principal, valuing IPOs is not different from valuing other 
stocks. The common approaches of discounted cash flow analysis and/or 
comparable firms analysis can be used. In the case of IPOs of the young 
growth firms in high technology industries, historical accounting information 
is of limited use in projecting future profits or cash flows. Thus, a 
preliminary valuation may rely heavily on how the market is valuing 
comparable firms. In some cases, publicly-traded firms in the same line of 
business are easy to find. In other cases, it may be difficult to find publicly-
traded “pure plays” to use for valuation purposes.  
Regardless of the method for pricing many studies both in developed and 
emerging markets show that the IPOs are underpriced and IPO 
underpricing has become a financial anomaly and has puzzled researchers 
since 1970s. Why do the firms leave money on the table? There are many 
theories aiming at explaining this financial anomaly. Since some of them 
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are very case or country specific, only main theories will be discussed in 
detail in the following chapters. 
Another anomaly in the IPO market is generally defined as the “hot issue” 
markets. This will be shortly handled in this study. 
The third anomaly known as the long run underperformance of IPOs will 
also be discussed in detail in the following chapters. This anomaly is a less 
studied field than the underpricing in the literature. Long run 
underperformance is usually proven by using 3 years cumulative market 
adjusted returns after the IPO. But some studies indicate that the long run 
underperformance can go up to six years. Why do the IPOs systematically 
underperforms the market? Although there are some other theories for the 
long run underperformance, one of the most important one indicates that 
the initial pricing of the IPO causes this anomaly. So, the first anomaly is a 
part of the answer of the third one or in other words the factors behind the 
performance of the future periods may lie back to the IPO process 3 or 
more years ago.  
This study mainly focuses on the above mentioned anomalies especially 
the first and the third ones in the IPO markets. The first chapter mainly 
focuses on the factors that determine the going public or not going public 
decision. The case of Turkish firms will also be handled shortly. The next 
chapter captures the models or theories aiming at explaining the anomalies 
mentioned above. After reviewing the literature, there is an empirical study 
for the Istanbul Stock Exchange to determine whether these anomalies 
exist in Turkey.   
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CHAPTER II 
2 GOING PUBLIC AND IPO 
 
The decision to go public is one of the most important and least studied 
questions in corporate finance. Most corporate finance textbooks limit 
themselves to describing the institutional aspects of this decision, providing 
only a few remarks on its motivation. The conventional wisdom is that going 
public is simply a stage in the growth of a company. Although there is some 
truth in it, this theory alone cannot explain the observed pattern of listings. 
Even in developed capital markets, like the U.S., some large companies 
are not public. In other countries, like Germany and Italy, publicly traded 
companies are the exceptions rather than the rule, and quite a few private 
companies are much larger than the average publicly traded company. 
These cross-sectional and cross-country differences indicate that going 
public is not a stage that all companies eventually reach, but is a choice. 
This begs the question of why some companies choose to use public equity 
markets and some don't.  
2.1 Going Public and Alternatives 
The firms can provide the financial sources which they need to make 
investments, sales etc. through internal and external sources. At the early 
stages of establishment most of the firms prefer the internal sources. The 
reason is that the value of a young firms depends on the growth potential 
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more than assets, it is hard for the investors to value these firms correctly 
[Ibbotson, Ritter, (1995), 1007]. From the firm’s point of view, internal 
finance is the source that the problems arising form information asymmetry 
is minimum. However the scare internal sources will restrict the growth 
potential of a firm. In developed countries especially in the USA, one 
alternative for these firms is the investment angels or venture capital. Both 
are not valid for most of the developing countries. An alternative to find 
funds for the firms in developing countries is going public. For a successful 
offering in the going public process, and getting funds with low cost, the 
timing and the pricing would be important. It is also important for the 
success of the secondary offerings and diminish the cost of funding. The 
costs in the going public process can be divided into two groups namely, 
direct and indirect costs [Ibbotson, Ritter, (1995), 993]. The direct costs are 
mainly the money paid to the intermediaries or underwriters and the legal 
institutions, the indirect costs are the effort and time spent by the 
management. The total cost and the pros and cons of going public are the 
important factors for a firm’s decision to go public or not. Although there 
may be other incentives or legal environment for different countries, there 
are many theories or hypothesis aiming to explain the going public process. 
2.2 Theories on Going Public 
The decision to go public is so complex that no single model can hope to 
capture all of the relevant costs and benefits. But almost all of the effects of 
this decision have been evaluated in one model or another.  
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2.2.1 The costs of going public 
2.2.1.1 Adverse selection 
Adverse selection mainly focuses on the informational asymmetry between 
issuers and investor. In general it is assumed that investors are less 
informed than the issuers about the true value of the companies going 
public. As indicated by (Leland and Pyle, 1977), (Rock (1986), this 
informational asymmetry adversely affects the average quality of the 
companies seeking a new listing and thus the price at which their shares 
can be sold. Especially in case of the listing of young and small companies, 
the adverse selection cost is a more serious obstacle than for old and large 
companies, as mentioned by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1995). If there is 
adverse selection, the probability of going public should be positively 
correlated with the age and/or the size of a company.  
2.2.1.2 Administrative expenses and fees 
As mentioned before, besides the initial under pricing, going public have 
direct costs such as underwriting fees, registration fees, etc. Also after IPO 
there are the yearly layouts on auditing, certification and dissemination of 
accounting information, stock exchange fees, etc. Since many of these 
expenses do not increase proportionally with the size of the IPO, they 
weigh relatively more on small companies. Ritter (1987) has estimated that 
in the US the fixed costs equal approximately $250,000 and the variable 
costs are about 7 percent of the gross proceeds of the IPO. Taking these 
variable costs into account and the existence of fixed costs of listing implies 
that the likelihood of an IPO should be positively correlated with company 
size. 
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I would like to add that being registered by the exchange or the capital 
markets boards may bring additional expenses for the firms after the IPO. 
Especially if most of the other firms in the same sector are unregistered, the 
firms going public can lose competitive advantage. 
2.2.1.3 Loss of confidentiality 
Stock exchanges’ regulations or rules on the disclosure requirement may 
force companies to disclose the data about R&D projects or future 
marketing strategies that may be crucial for their competitiveness. They 
also expose them to close scrutiny from tax authorities, reducing their 
scope for tax elusion and evasion relative to private companies. This point 
was first pointed by Campbell (1979), Yosha (1995) has shown that in 
equilibrium firms with more sensitive information are deterred from going 
public if the costs of a public offering are sufficiently high. So we can expect 
that there is a negative correlation between the R&D intensity of an industry 
and the probability of an IPO. 
2.2.2 The benefits of going public 
2.2.2.4 Overcoming borrowing constraints 
Gaining access to a source of finance alternative to banks is probably the 
most cited benefit of going public, which is explicitly or implicitly present in 
most models. The opportunity to tap public markets for funds should be 
particularly appealing for companies with large current and future 
investments, high leverage, and high growth. All these factors should be 
positively related with the likelihood of an IPO [Pagano, Panette, Zingales, 
1997].  
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By gaining access to the stock market and disseminating information to the 
generality of investors, a company elicits outside competition to its lender 
and ensures a lower cost of credit, a larger supply of external finance or 
both, as highlighted by Rajan (1992). The prediction here is that companies 
facing higher interest rates and more concentrated credit sources are more 
likely to go public, and credit will become cheaper and more readily 
available after an IPO, controlling for profitability and leverage. 
2.2.2.5 Liquidity and portfolio diversification 
As many market microstructure models show, the liquidity of a company's 
shares is an increasing function of the trading volume. Share trading on an 
organized exchange is cheaper, especially for small shareholders. This 
creates another reason to expect a positive relationship between size and 
the likelihood of an IPO. Going public also provides diversification. This can 
be achieved directly, by divesting from the company and reinvesting in 
other assets, or indirectly, by having the company raise fresh equity capital 
after the IPO and acquire stakes in other companies. If diversification is an 
important motive in the decision to go public, as in Pagano (1993), it is 
reasonable to expect riskier companies to be more likely to go public, and 
controlling shareholders to sell a large portion of their shares at the time of 
the IPO or soon afterwards [Pagano, Panette, Zingales, 1997].  
2.2.2.6 Monitoring 
As mentioned by Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) going public, provides a 
managerial discipline, both by creating the danger of hostile takeovers and 
by exposing the market's assessment of managerial decisions. More 
efficient compensation schemes for their managers can be designed, (e.g. 
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indexing their salaries to the stock price or by offering them stock options). 
Also recently many exchanges have corporate governance rules or 
principles that force the firms to work more efficiently.  
2.2.2.7 Investor recognition 
In most of the emerging markets going public is an additional prestige for 
the firm. Listing on a major exchange can act as an advertisement for the 
company. Merton (1987) has captured this point in a capital asset pricing 
model with incomplete information, showing that stock prices are higher the 
greater the number of investors aware of the company's securities. In a 
study made by Kadlec and McConnell (1994), there is an indirect support 
that when companies already listed elsewhere announce to dual listing in 
New York, their stock yields a 5% percent abnormal return on average.  
2.2.2.8 Change of control 
In this model IPO is a step for the owner who wants to sell the company. 
The decision of a firm to go public is the result of a value maximizing 
decision made by an initial owner who wants to eventually sell his 
company. By going public, the initial owner can change the proportion of 
cash flow rights and control rights which he will retain when he bargains 
with a potential buyer Zingales (1995).  
2.2.2.9 Windows of opportunity 
In times of the bull’s markets sometimes the stock prices rise so much that 
the link between the company’s real value and market value differs 
seriously. If there are periods in which stocks are mispriced, as suggested 
by Ritter (1991), companies which realize that other companies in their 
industry are overvalued have an incentive to go public. In some papers the 
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buoyancy of the relevant market is measured by the median market-to-
book ratio of public companies in the same industry. A high market-to-book 
ratio may alternatively indicate that rational investors place a high valuation 
on the future growth opportunities in the industry.  
Table 1. Benefits of Going Public 
Model Empirical predictions 
  Effects on the 
probability of IPO 
Consequences after 
IPO 
Overcome 
borrowing 
constraints 
 IPO more likely for 
high-debt/ high-
investment 
companies 
Deleveraging/ 
high investment 
Diversification Pagano (1993) Riskier companies 
more likely to go 
public 
Controlling 
shareholder 
decreases his stake 
Liquidity Market 
microstructure 
models 
Smaller companies 
less likely to go 
public 
Diffuse stock 
ownership 
Stock market 
monitoring 
Holmström and 
Tirole (1993), 
Pagano and Röell 
(1996) 
High-investment 
companies more 
likely to go public 
Large use of stock- 
based incentive 
contracts 
Enlarge set of 
potential investors 
Merton (1987)  Diffuse stock 
ownership 
Increase bargaining 
powers with banks 
Rajan (1992) IPO more likely for 
companies paying 
higher rates 
Decrease in 
borrowing rates 
Optimal way to 
transfer control 
Zingales (1995a)  Higher turnover of 
control 
Exploit mispricing Ritter (1991) High market-to-
book values in the 
relevant industry 
Underperformance of 
IPOs 
Table 2. Costs of Going Public 
Model Empirical predictions 
  Effects on the 
probability of IPO 
Consequences after 
IPO 
Adverse selection 
and moral hazard 
Leland and Pyle 
(1977), Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1995) 
Smaller and 
younger companies 
less likely to go 
public 
Negative relation 
between 
performance and 
ownership 
Fixed costs Ritter (1987) Smaller companies 
less likely to go 
public 
 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Campbell (1979), 
Yosha (1995) 
High-tech 
companies less 
likely to go public 
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2.2.3 Going public and Turkish Companies 
The Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey had two questionnaires 
relating to going public as a source of finance in 1991 and 1996. These 
questionnaires provide important clues on the financial structure of the 
Turkish firms, the important factors in their financial decision and on the 
determination of the factors that prevent them going public.  
The summary of some of the important points in these questionnaires are 
as follows. The cost of the funds is usually more important for the firms than 
the maturity, when deciding to find the financial sources they need for their 
investments. The first source in for the working capital is the short term 
bank credits. The second important sources are the commercial 
borrowings. Although the firms need long term funds they choose short 
term borrowings as the cost is lower. Considering the financial situation of 
Turkey in those years this may be logical for the firm. Some of the firms 
(12%) prefer borrowing from abroad not only for the cost is lower but also it 
is easier to provide the sources in a shorter time. 86% of the firms declared 
that they never used capital markets as a source of finance. In 1991, 90.2% 
of the firms in the questionnaire stated that they will never use the capital 
markets or they don’t think about going public at any time. Most of the firms 
declared that they didn’t want to go public as they didn’t need this fund or 
they were afraid to loose the control of the firm. Although the firms stated 
the two main reasons as follows, on the other hand the firms thinking an 
IPO stated that they wanted to go public as the cost of the funds are lower 
and the maturity is longer. In the later questionnaire the firms mentioned 
that some tax or investment incentives for the public firms would promote 
going public.  
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Another important factor preventing the firms going public at those times 
was that the distinction between public firms and the publicly traded firms 
and being listed in the exchange was not clear.  
The firms were accepted public if the shares were distributed among more 
than 250 people (100 investors were adequate for being a public firm in the 
previous regulation). So the firms could increase the number of their 
investors artificially without being listed or traded in the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) to get the incentives for the public firms.  
The latest ISE regulation on the initial listing of securities representing 
partnership rights is as follows. 
Article 13- If the securities representing partnership rights are being listed 
initially, the application must cover the entire securities of same type issued 
until the application date, and for the corporation; 
a) The financial statements of the company for the last three years 
including the one for the respective quarter must have been independently 
audited,  
b) At least three calendar years must have elapsed since the establishment 
of the corporation and financial statements of the last three years must 
have been publicly disclosed,  
c) The corporation must have made profits before tax in the last two 
consecutive years prior to the application date (it should have made profits 
in the previous year if the market capitalization of the publicly offered 
shares is at least YTL 33 million¹ or if the free-float rate is at least 35%),  
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d) The shareholders’ equity in the last independently audited financial 
statement of the corporation must be at least YTL 11 million,  
e) Market capitalization of the publicly offered shares of the corporation 
must be at least YTL 17 million and the rate of the nominal value of these 
shares to paid-in or issued capital must be at least 25% (if this rate is below 
25%, market capitalization of the publicly offered shares must be at least 
YTL 33 million),  
f) The Exchange management must have had the corporation’s financial 
structure examined and accepted its ability to continue as an ongoing 
concern,  
g) The corporation’s Articles of Incorporation must not include any 
provisions restricting the transfer and circulation of the securities to be 
traded on the Exchange or preventing the shareholders from exercising 
their rights,  
h) Significant legal disputes which might affect the corporation’s production 
or activities must not exist,  
i) For reasons other than acceptable to the Exchange, the corporation must 
not have suspended its production activities for more than three months 
within the previous year, not filed for liquidation or entered into composition 
or any other arrangement with its creditors, and not have faced similar 
situations determined by the Exchange,  
j) The corporation’s securities must comply with the criteria pre-determined 
by the ISE management in terms of current and potential trading volumes,  
 22
k) It must be documented that the corporation’s legal situation in terms of 
its establishment and activities as well as the legal situation of its shares 
comply with the respective legislation.   
For the securities with special characteristics such as securities with no 
voting rights and the securities with attached privileges, Executive Council 
may decide to demand additional requirements as well as may not ask for 
some conditions stated in section one. 
The amounts stated in section one, subsection (c), (d) and (e) may be 
increased by the Executive Council considering the average increase in the 
wholesale price index published by the State Institute of Statistics. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
3 ANOMALIES IN IPOs 
 
3.1 Underpricing 
In principal, valuing IPOs is no different from valuing other stocks. The 
common approaches of discounted cash flow analysis and/or comparable 
firms analysis can be used. In the case of IPOs are of young growth firms in 
high technology industries, historical accounting information is of limited 
use in projecting future profits or cash flows. Thus, a preliminary valuation 
may rely heavily on how the market is valuing comparable firms. In some 
cases, publicly-traded firms in the same line of business are easy to find. In 
other cases, it may be difficult to find publicly-traded “pure plays” to use for 
valuation purposes. The question is that if these analyses work for 
valuation why is there a systematic underpricing in the IPOs market? IPO 
underpricing has become a financial anomaly and has puzzled researchers 
since Stoll and Curley (1970 and Ibbotson (1975) first documented the IPO 
underpricing on the US markets. It is obvious that underpricing is a cost for 
companies that go public. Therefore, the determination of the initial price of 
a share is very important. If the price is high, the demand for the shares can 
will be decreased and the IPO will be unsuccessful and if the price is low, it 
is “money left on the table” for the company. The first anomaly namely the 
“underpricing” is examined in many studies in literature, both for developed 
and developing markets.  
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As many markets have the underpricing in IPOs, there existed a great 
literature on the issue. Although the reasons can be country specific, the 
theories or hypothesis aiming at explaining the underpricing phenomenon 
are usually grouped as the asymmetric information models, institutional 
explanations, ownership and control, behavioral explanations.  
3.1.1 Theories of Initial Underpricing 
3.1.1.1 Asymmetric Information Models 
3.1.1.1.1 The Winner’s Curse 
Asymmetric information models of underpricing assume that one of the 
parties, namely the issuing firm, the bank underwriting and marketing the 
deal, and the investors buying the stock in an IPO, knows more than the 
others. The first model based on this assumption is the Rock’s “winner 
curse” model which is actually based on the application of Akerlof’s (1970) 
lemons problem. In Rock’s model there are the investors groups in the 
market that are divided as the informed and uninformed. Rock’s (1986) 
winner’s curse model turns on information heterogeneity among these 
investors. Assuming that some investors are better informed about the true 
value of the shares on offer than are investors in general, the issuing firm, 
or its underwriting bank Rock stated that when informed investors would 
only bid for attractively priced IPOs. This imposes a ‘winner’s curse’ on 
uninformed investors. In unattractive offerings, they receive all the shares 
they have bid for, while in attractive offerings, their demand is partly 
crowded out by the informed. So one of the most important result of this 
model is that underpricing is lower if information is distributed more 
homogeneously across investor groups. There are many empirical studies 
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on this model. Michaely and Shaw (1994) argue that as the information 
heterogeneity goes to zero, the winner’s curse disappears and so the 
underpricing. At the heart of the winner’s curse model is the idea that, if 
properly adjusted for rationing, uninformed investors’ abnormal returns are 
zero, on average – that is, just enough to ensure their informed, in order to 
avoid the unattractive IPOs [Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
Rock assumes that as the demand of only the informed investors would be 
insufficient to occupy all shares on offer even in attractive offerings, the 
primary market is dependent on the continued participation of uninformed 
investors. The natural outcome of this assumption is that all IPOs must be 
underpriced. 
Another assumption of the Rock’s model is that firms going public benefit 
from underpricing, because it is the key to ensuring the continued 
participation in the IPO market of the uninformed, whose capital is needed 
by assumption. However this causes a dilemma, on the other hand as 
underpricing is clearly costly to a firm going public. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
argue that as repeat players, investment banks have an incentive to ensure 
that new issues are underpriced by enough lest they lose underwriting 
commissions in the future. Investment banks thus coerce issuers into 
underpricing. Of course, they cannot underprice too much for fear of losing 
underwriting market share.  
The earliest study of Koh and Walter’s (1989) analyze Singapore. During 
the 1970s and 1980s oversubscribed IPOs were allocated by random 
ballot. This system provides that if two investors bidding for the same 
number of shares they had an equal chance of receiving an allocation. 
Using data on 66 IPOs, Koh and Walter show that the likelihood of 
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receiving an allocation was negatively related to the degree of underpricing, 
and that average initial returns fall substantially, from 27% to 1%, when 
adjusted for rationing. Another paper done by Levis (1990), conducted 
similar results for U.K. Keloharju (1993) studied on Finland and reached 
similar evidence. Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003) find that uninformed 
investors earned a negative allocation-weighted initial return in Israel in the 
early 1990s, of –1.2% on average. 
The distinction between the informed and uninformed investors groups are 
generally made due to institutional versus retail investors. There are 
conflicting results in the literature. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) show that 
there is little difference in the size of allocations institutions receive in 
underpriced and overpriced issues. On the other hand Aggarwal, Prabhala, 
and Puri (2002), find that institutional investors earn greater returns on their 
IPO allocations than do retail investors. This may be because they are 
allocated more stock in those IPOs. By focusing on a segment of the IPO 
market in which heterogeneity is likely to be low, this prediction can be 
tested. According to Michaely and Shaw, institutional investors largely 
avoid IPOs of master limited partnership (MLPs), for a variety of tax 
reasons. If the informed investors are mainly institutions, and retail 
investors are mainly uninformed, information heterogeneity among 
investors in MLPs should be low. Consistent with this prediction, Michaely 
and Shaw show that average underpricing among 39 MLP IPOs completed 
between 1984 and 1988 is –0.04%. For comparison, underpricing among 
non-MLP IPOs over the same time period averaged 8.5%. Though it there 
are differences among the findings,  
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The general rule is that underpricing should increase in the ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the IPO firm, [Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter 
(1986)]. Most of the empirical studies in IPO underpricing checks the ex 
ante uncertainty, by company characteristics, offering characteristics, 
prospectus disclosure, and aftermarket variables. Company characteristics 
usually include measures of size such as log sales (Ritter (1984)), or the 
industry the company is from (Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu 
(2003)). Gross proceeds are popular offering characteristics for valuation of 
uncertainty. The number of uses of IPO proceeds as disclosed in the 
prospectus (Beatty and Ritter (1986)) and the number of risk factors listed 
in the prospectus (Beatty and Welch (1996)). However, in the absence of 
rules standardizing what uses and risks must be disclosed, it is unclear 
whether variation in these measures reflects underlying differences in 
uncertainty or merely in drafting. A potentially more promising approach 
might be to identify specific uses or risk factors that, if present, indicate 
higher uncertainty. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), for instance, argue that 
firms intending to use their IPO proceeds mainly to fund “operating 
expenses” rather than investment or debt repayment are potentially more 
risky. Finally, aftermarket variables such as trading volume (Miller and 
Reilly (1987)) or volatility (Ritter (1984, 1987)) rely on information which 
was not in fact available at the time of the IPO. Indeed, it is even possible 
that such variables are endogenous to the outcome of the IPO. For 
instance, heavily underpriced IPOs tend to generate more investor interest 
and so more after-market trading, with the causation running from 
underpricing to after-market trading behavior rather than the other way 
around [Ljungqvist, 2005].  
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As underpricing represents an involuntary cost to the issuer they would not 
be willing to make a highly underpriced IPO. As the information asymmetry 
theory suggest, this may be possible by reducing the information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.  One possible way 
to do this is to hire a prestigious underwriter (Booth and Smith (1986), 
Carter and Manaster (1990), Michaely and Shaw (1994)) or a reputable 
auditor (Titman and Trueman (1986)). But the empirical evidence on this 
point is mixed. Early studies, focusing on data from the 1970s and 1980s, 
have tended to find a negative relation between various measures of 
underwriter reputation and initial returns. Results are, however, highly 
sensitive to the period studied. Beatty and Welch (1996), who use data 
from the early 1990s, show that the sign of the relation has flipped since the 
1970s and 1980s, such that more prestigious underwriters are now 
associated with higher underpricing. Some studies Carter and Manaster 
(1990) provide a ranking of underwriters. Other studies (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991) measure underwriters’ reputation by their market share. This 
approach attracted more attention and is widely used. Many studies found 
that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of underwriter reputation 
measure.  
3.1.1.1.2 Information Revelation Theories  
Theories of book building stress the important role of investment banks in 
eliciting information that is valuable in price-setting, and the benefit of giving 
them discretion over allocation decisions. If some investors are better 
informed than either the company or other investors as assumed by Rock, 
eliciting their information before setting the price becomes one of the key 
tasks for the investment bank taking a company public. The challenge for 
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the underwriter is to design a mechanism that induces investors to reveal 
their information truthfully, by making it in their best interest to do so 
[Ljungqvist, 2005]. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) show that bookbuilding can, under 
certain conditions, be such a mechanism. The more aggressive are 
investors’ bids, the more the offer price is raised.  
The price revision over the course of book building and the first-day 
underpricing return are positively correlated. This is often referred to as the 
‘partial adjustment’ phenomenon (Hanley (1993)). Cross-sectionally, the 
more positive the information (and so the greater the incentive to withhold 
it), the more money has to be left on the table. If underwriters and 
institutional investors deal with each other repeatedly in the IPO market, the 
cost of information acquisition can be reduced [Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
The Benveniste and Spindt (1989) paradigm has been extended in 
numerous ways. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) investigate its interaction 
with Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse. If bookbuilding succeeds in extracting 
the informed investors’ private information, the informational asymmetry 
among investors will be reduced. and thus the level of underpricing.  
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) 
tested the bookbuilding theories of IPO underpricing by using data from two 
different European investment banks. In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, 
investors submitting price-limited bids should therefore receive 
disproportionately larger allocations than investors submitting strike orders, 
and this allocation bias should become more pronounced, the more 
aggressive the price limit. The results generally support the Benveniste-
Spindt model. Consistent with this conjecture, Cornelli and Goldreich show 
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that investors submitting price-limited bids receive larger allocations when 
the book contains fewer limit bids.  
Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) analyze a more recent dataset 
covering 164 IPOs managed by nine different banks in 1997 and 1998. As 
in Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), institutional investors are allocated the lion’s 
share of IPO stock and institutional allocations increase in the price revision 
relative to the filing range. Underpricing, in turn, is larger the more stock 
institutions were allocated. When comparable firms’ valuations are low, the 
IPO is likely to generate relatively little ‘surplus’ for the issuer [Ljungqvist, 
2005]. 
3.1.1.1.3 Principal–Agent Models  
The first theoretical models linking agency conflicts and IPO underpricing 
goes back more than 20 years Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron 
(1982). Such models focused on the underwriter’s benefit from underpricing 
and how a bank’s informational advantage over issuing companies might 
allow the bank to exert sub-optimal effort in marketing and distributing the 
stock. If effort is not perfectly observable and verifiable, banks find 
themselves in a moral hazard situation when acting as the issuers’ agents 
in selling an IPO.  
Loughran and Ritter (2003) pointed the potential for agency problems 
between the investment bank and the issuing firm. They declared that the 
more uncertain the value of the firm, the greater the asymmetry of 
information between issuer and underwriter, and thus the more valuable the 
latter’s services become, resulting in greater underpricing. After the “dot 
com” bubble many other writers studied agency models of IPO 
underpricing. 
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In principle, issuers can lessen agency conflicts either by monitoring the 
investment bank’s selling effort and bargain hard over the price, or by using 
contract design to realign the bank’s incentives by making its compensation 
an increasing function of the offer price. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
provide evidence consistent with monitoring and bargaining in the U.S. in 
the second half of the 1990s. The first-day returns are lower, the greater 
are the monitoring incentives of the issuing firms’ decision-makers.  
Higher equity ownership gives the decision-maker a greater stake in the 
outcome of the pricing negotiations, while underpricing stock sold for 
personal account represents a direct wealth transfer from the decision-
maker to IPO investors. These results indicate that issuing firms’ 
contractual choices affect the pricing behavior of their IPO underwriters. 
Moreover, the empirical results cannot reliably reject the hypothesis that the 
intensity of incentives is optimal, and so that contracts are efficient. A 
potentially powerful way to test the agency models is to investigate the 
underpricing experience of IPOs that have little or no informational 
asymmetry between issuer and bank [Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
Some of the early studies Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), show that 
investment banks underwriting their own IPOs suffered as much 
underpricing as other issuers. However later studies by Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) proved that the greater the investment bank’s equity 
holding, the lower are first-day underpricing returns.  
3.1.1.1.4 Underpricing as a Signal of Firm Quality  
These theories emphasis that if companies have better information about 
the present value or risk of their future cash flows than do investors, 
underpricing may be used to signal the company’s ‘true’ high value. 
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Although this brings a cost to the firm in an IPO, this signaling may allow 
the issuer more successful secondary offerings at a later date. In the words 
of Ibbotson (1975), who is credited with the original intuition for the IPO 
signaling literature, issuers underprice in order to ‘leave a good taste in 
investors’ mouths’ [Ljungqvist, 2005]. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) have contributed theories with this 
feature.  
The signaling models state that underpricing is positively related to the 
probability, size, speed, and announcement effect of subsequent equity 
sales. As stated in the other asymmetric information theories of 
underpricing, the signaling models also predict a positive relation between 
underpricing and the ex-ante uncertainty about firm value.  
Michaely and Shaw (1994) estimate a simultaneous system using 
underwriter reputation to identify the underpricing equation and post-IPO 
performance to identify the equation modeling the size of the seasoned 
equity offering. The results do not support the signaling models. They found 
that  underpricing is not significantly related to the reissue decision. 
Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) also found similar results. Welch 
(1996) using the decision how long to wait before returning to the equity 
market as an endogenous variable concluded that the longer a firm waits, 
the smaller is the underpricing.  
3.1.1.2 Institutional Explanations  
3.1.1.2.5 Legal insurance or lawsuit avoidance hypothesis 
The first studies of Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), assumes that 
companies deliberately sell their stock at a discount to reduce the likelihood 
of future lawsuits from shareholders disappointed with the post-IPO 
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performance of their shares. This is called as the legal insurance or lawsuit 
avoidance hypothesis. The idea is expected as country (US) specific as 
many other studies have unsupporting findings. Australia (Lee, Taylor, and 
Walter (1996)), Finland (Keloharju (1993)), Germany (Ljungqvist (1997)), 
Japan (Beller, Terai, and Levine (1992)), Sweden (Rydqvist (1994)), 
Switzerland (Kunz and Aggarwal (1994)), or the U.K. (Jenkinson (1990)), all 
of which experience underpricing.  
Lowry and Shu (2002) estimate that nearly 6 percent of companies floated 
in the U.S. between 1988 and 1995 subsequently were sued for violations 
relating to the IPO, with damages awarded to plaintiffs averaging 13.3% of 
IPO proceeds. Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor (1992), and Hensler 
(1995) argue that intentional underpricing may act like insurance against 
such securities litigation. Tınıç (1988) proposes that the enactment of the 
1933 Securities Act represents a regime shift that potentially allows us to 
test the legal liability hypothesis. Prior to the 1933 Act, the principle of 
caveat emptor largely protected issuers and investment banks against 
litigation risk, and so underpricing should have been low. After 1933, 
litigation risk should have featured more prominently when investment 
banks priced deals, and so underpricing should have increased.  
Hughes and Thakor propose a trade-off between on the one hand 
minimizing the probability of litigation, and on the other maximizing the 
gross proceeds from the IPO. 
However Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) study a sample of 93 IPO firms that 
were sued and compare them to a sample of 93 IPOs that were not sued, 
matched on IPO year, offer size, and underwriter prestige. Conflicting with 
some other studies, they found that sued firms are just as underpriced as 
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the control sample, and underpriced firms are sued more often than 
overpriced firms. Drake and Vetsuypens interpret these findings as 
inconsistent with the legal insurance hypothesis. Lowry and Shu (2002) 
argue that such an ex post comparison misses the point because it does 
not truly consider the probability of being sued. Empirical analysis of the 
link between underpricing and the probability of litigation needs to be 
careful about the following simultaneity problem: firms choose a certain 
level of underpricing to reduce the probability of litigation, but the level of 
underpricing they choose depends on the probability of being sued 
[Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) investigate whether observed 
underpricing is the by product of price support, as Ruud proposes, or 
whether it may have independent causes. Using the aforementioned 
mixture-of distributions approach, they estimate the average underpricing 
returns for the two hypothesized distributions of supported and unsupported 
IPOs. If Ruud is correct in saying that there is no deliberate underpricing, 
then the initial return distribution of unsupported offerings should have a 
mean of zero. This, however, is not what Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick 
find.  
3.1.1.2.6 Tax Arguments 
This hypothesis can cover only one side of underpricing of IPOs and could 
be very country specific, as tax regulations differ among countries. Rydqvist 
(1997), in his study on Swedish IPOs found supporting results. As the 
regulations in Sweden taxed employment income much more heavily than 
capital gains, there was an incentive. When the Swedish tax authorities 
made underpricing-related gains subject to income tax, removing the 
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incentive to allocate underpriced stock to employees in 1990, underpricing 
fell from an average of 41% in 1980-1989 to 8% in 1990-1994.  
3.1.1.3 Ownership and Control  
This theory assumes that going public is, actually a step towards the 
separation of ownership and control. If the separation of ownership and 
control is incomplete, an agency problem between non-managing and 
managing shareholders can arise (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Emprical 
tests give conflicting results. Brennan and Franks (1997) view underpricing 
as a means to entrench managerial control and the attendant agency costs 
by avoiding monitoring by a large outside shareholder, Stoughton and 
Zechner’s (1998) analysis instead suggests that underpricing may be used 
to minimize agency costs by encouraging monitoring. 
3.1.1.3.7 Underpricing as a Means to Retain Control 
In the Brennan and Franks (1997) model, underpricing gives managers the 
opportunity to protect their private benefits by allocating shares strategically 
when taking their company public. The role of underpricing in this view is to 
generate excess demand. Excess demand enables managers to ration 
investors so that they end up holding smaller stakes in the business. There 
are also supporting and unsupporting emprical tests of this idea. Booth and 
Chua (1996) argue that if there is a more dispersed ownership structure, as 
the investors think that there will be  a more liquid secondary market for 
their shares, the owners will value more. Zingales stated that the link 
between underpricing and ownership dispersion is not sufficient evidence in 
favor of Brennan and Franks’ model. Zingales (1995) assumes that an IPO 
is frequently only the first stage in a multi-period sell-out strategy which will 
culminate in the complete transfer of ownership and control from the 
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original founders to new owners. Brennan and Franks, on the other hand, 
assume that the IPO is designed to prevent a transfer of control in spite of 
the partial transfer of ownership [Ljungqvist, 2005].  
Some other studies focused on the issuing of non-voting shares as a 
guarantee for the managers not to loose the control of the company. Smart 
and Zutter (2003) find that U.S.companies that issue non-voting stocks in 
their IPOs are less underpriced and have higher institutional ownership 
after the IPO. This is consistent with the notion that non-voting stock can 
substitute for the Brennan-Franks mechanism. Arugaslan, Cook, and 
Kieschnick (2003) found the size as an important determinant of 
institutional investors’ stock selection.  
3.1.1.3.8 Underpricing as a Means to Reduce Agency Costs 
Brennan and Franks (1997) implicitly assume that, in the wake of the 
separation of ownership and control, managers try to maximize their 
expected private utility by entrenching their control benefits. However, it 
could be argued that managers should actually seek to minimize, rather 
than maximize, their scope for extracting private benefits of control 
[Ljungqvist, 2005]. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) observe that, in contrast 
to Brennan and Franks, it may be value-enhancing to allocate shares to a 
large outside investor who is able to monitor managerial actions.  
3.1.1.4 Behavioral Explanations 
Considering that the IPO firms by definition have no prior share price 
history and tend to be young, immature, and relatively informationally 
opaque it is hard to value, them.  As researchers are suspicious about the 
sufficiency of informational models, the risk of lawsuits, or control 
considerations they involved in the behavioral explanations for IPO 
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underpricing. Behavioral theories assume either the presence of ‘irrational’ 
investors who bid up the price of IPO shares beyond true value, or that 
issuers are subject to behavioral biases and therefore fail to put pressure 
on the underwriting banks to have underpricing reduced. These 
explanations are immature compared to the informational models. The 
explanations that can be put in this category are grouped as ‘informational 
cascades’, investor sentiment, prospect theory and mental accounting, 
3.1.1.4.1 Cascades 
The starting point of informational cascades is that later investors can state 
their bids on the bids of earlier investors, rationally disregarding their own 
information. Welch (1992) shows that ‘informational cascades’ can develop 
in some forms of IPOs if investors make their investment decisions 
sequentially: If the initial sales are successful it will be a signal for 
subsequent investors that earlier investors held favorable. On the contrary, 
if the initial sales are disappointing, it can discourage later investors from 
investing irrespective of their private signals. As a consequence, demand 
either snowballs or remains low over time. In this sense cascades may play 
a role in explaining IPO underpricing. However we should keep in mind that 
in book building cascades do not occur. Therefore less underpricing is 
required. In addition if it is assumed that investors can communicate freely, 
cascades also do not form. However Welch (1992) proves that issuers are 
better off with cascades than with free communication. He also adds that 
IPOs managed by national underwriters are predicted to be less 
underpriced. He also points to the factors that the issuers pay attention 
when deciding which type of underwriter to choose. In other words he 
mentions that the choice of underwriter is not random. In conclusion, 
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Welch’s cascades model remains one of the least explored explanations of 
IPO underpricing. 
3.1.1.4.2 Investor Sentiment 
One of the popular subjects of the behavioral finance is the effect of 
‘irrational’ or ‘sentiment’ investors’ behaviors on stock prices. The model 
predicts that companies going public in a hot market subsequently 
underperform, both relative to the first-day price and to the offer price. 
Underperformance relative to the first-day price is not surprising; it follows 
from the two assumptions of sentiment investors and short-sale constraints 
(Miller (1977)). One extension of the model is the negative correlation 
between underpricing and long run performance as documented by Ritter 
(1991).  However Krigman, Shaw, and 62 Womack (1999) find a positive 
relation. In the Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2004) model, the relation is 
not necessarily monotonic. In particular, the relation is negative only if the 
probability of the hot market ending is small. 
If the hot market is highly likely to end, the issuer optimally reduces the 
offer size, implying regular investors hold smaller inventories and so require 
less underpricing to break even. At the same time, the reduction in offer 
size aggravates long-run underperformance, given the negative slope of 
the sentiment demand curve. Consistent with evidence from the 1990s 
(Beatty and Welch (1996)), Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2004) predict 
that underpricing increases in underwriter reputation. Underwriters enjoying 
a large IPO deal flow can more easily punish regular investors who attempt 
to free-ride on the inventory-holding strategy by dumping their shares 
prematurely, before the price falls. This in turn implies that the more active 
banks can underwrite larger IPOs, as more inventory can be held over time. 
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Since underpricing is compensation for the expected inventory losses in the 
face of a non-zero probability that the hot market will end before all 
inventory has been unloaded, the more active underwriters will be 
associated with greater underpricing [Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
3.1.1.4.3 Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) focused on behavioral biases among the 
decision-makers of the IPO firm, rather than among investors. They 
assume that the decision-maker’s initial valuation beliefs are reflected in the 
mean of the indicative price range reported in the issuing firm’s IPO 
registration statement.  
As argued earlier, offer prices appear only to ‘partially adjust’ (Hanley 
(1993)) in the sense that large positive revisions from the reference point 
are associated with large initial price increases from the offer price during 
the first day of trading. Such partial adjustment is consistent with both the 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) information-acquisition model of IPO 
underpricing and Loughran and Ritter’s argument. If the shares could have 
been sold at the higher first-day trading price then there would be a positive 
gain as wealth.  
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2004) investigate whether CEOs deemed 
‘satisfied’ with the underwriter’s performance according to Loughran and 
Ritter’s story are more likely to hire their IPO underwriters to lead-manage 
later seasoned equity offerings. Controlling for other known factors, IPO 
firms are less likely to switch underwriters for their SEO when they were 
deemed ‘satisfied’ with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters 
also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract 
higher fees for subsequent transactions involving ‘satisfied’ decision-
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makers. While these tests suggest there is explanatory power in the 
behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from 
expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns 
[Ljungqvist, 2005]. 
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3.2 Hot Issue Markets 
The second anomaly is that cycles exist in both in the volume and the 
average initial returns of IPOs. Graph 1 shows that high initial returns tend 
to be followed by rising IPO volume. The periods of high average initial 
returns and rising volume are known as "hot issue" markets. The volume of 
IPOs, both in the U.S. and other countries, shows a strong tendency to be 
high following periods of high stock market returns, when stocks are selling 
at a premium to book value. Rational explanations for the existence of hot 
issue markets are difficult to come by.  
Hot issue markets exist in other countries as well as the U.S. For example, 
there was a hot issue market in the United Kingdom between the "Big 
Bang" (the end of fixed commission rates) in October 1986 and the crash a 
year later. In South Korea, there was a hot issue market in 1988 that 
coincided with a major bull market Ritter (1998). 
Graph 1. Average initial returns by month for S.E.C.-registered IPOs in 
the U.S. during 1977-96 
 
 
Source: Ritter (1998), Initial Public Offerings. 
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Graph 2. The number of IPOs by month in the U.S. during 1977-96, 
excluding closed-end fund 
 
 
Source: Ritter (1998), Initial Public Offerings. 
 
Graph 3. Number of IPOs per Month in the ISE 
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Graph 4. IPOs by month in ISE 
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3.3 Long Term Underperformance of IPOs  
The secondary market performance of IPOs is generally defined as the 
long term performance on a three year basis. Long term underperformance 
of IPOs is the third anomaly. Most of the studies on the third anomaly of the 
IPOs provide evidence for the long term underperformance. Ritter (1991), 
in his study for the 1975-84 period consisting 1526 IPOs find that after the 
36 months the adjusted return is -15%. He also found that 
underperformance is much more for the higher the offering amounts and 
young firms.  Loughran (1993) investigated 3656 IPOs in NASDAQ for the 
1967-1987 period and stated that the underperformance is also valid even 
in the sixth year after IPO. Loughran & Ritter (1995), worked on 4.753 IPOs 
at NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange for 1970-1990. Accepting the 
first day price as buy price and making a control group with similar market 
capitalization they find that IPOs provided 5% return where the control 
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group provided 12%. Wang, Chan& Gau (1992), find that the long run 
performance in the first nine months is -8.9 for the investment companies 
that had 2.8% underpricing for the first day. 
Long run underperformance is a less studied field in literature than the 
underpricing anomaly. The theories or hypothesis trying to explain this 
anomaly are as follows. 
3.3.1 The divergence of opinion hypothesis 
One argument is that investors who are most optimistic about an IPO will 
be the buyers. If there is a great deal of uncertainty about the value of an 
IPO the valuations of optimistic investors will be much higher than those of 
pessimistic investors. As time goes on and more information becomes 
available, the divergence of opinion between optimistic and pessimistic 
investors will narrow, and consequently, the market price will drop. 
3.3.2 The impresario hypothesis 
The "impresario" hypothesis argues that the market for IPOs is subject to 
fads and that IPOs are underpriced by investment bankers (the 
impresarios) to create the appearance of excess demand, just as the 
promoter of a rock concert attempts to make it an "event." This hypothesis 
predicts that companies with the highest initial returns should have the 
lowest subsequent returns. There is some evidence of this in the long run, 
but in the first six months, momentum effects seem to dominate. One 
survey of individual investors in IPOs found that only 26 percent of the 
respondents did any fundamental analysis of the relation between the offer 
price and the firm's underlying value. 
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3.3.3 The windows of opportunity hypothesis 
If there are periods when investors are especially optimistic about the 
growth potential of companies going public, the large cycles in volume may 
represent a response by firms attempting to "time" their IPOs to take 
advantage of these swings in investor sentiment. Of course, due to normal 
business cycle activity, one would expect to see some variation through 
time in the volume of IPOs. The large swings in volume displayed in Graph 
5, however, seems difficult to explain as merely normal business cycle 
activity.  
The windows of opportunity hypothesis predicts that firms going public in 
high volume periods are more likely to be overvalued than other IPOs. This 
has the testable implication that the high-volume periods should be 
associated with the lowest long-run returns. This pattern indeed exists. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
4 EMPRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 IPO Underpricing, Evidence from International Studies 
Graph 5. IPO Returns in the United States: 1960-2003 
 
Source: Ljungqvist, 2005 
 
The figure reports quarterly equal-weighted average initial IPO returns in % 
for 14,906 IPOs completed in the United States between 1960 and 2003, 
calculated as the first-day closing price over the IPO offer price less one. 
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Graph 6. IPO Returns in Europe: 1990-2003 
 
Source: Ljungqvist, 2005 
 
The figure reports equal-weighted average initial IPO returns in % for 19 
European countries, calculated as the aftermarket trading price over the 
IPO offer price less one. Aftermarket trading prices are measured on the 
first day of trading in all countries except France and Greece, where they 
are measured on the fifth day of trading due to daily volatility limits. IPOs 
are identified by the author using a range of sources including national 
stock exchanges, Thomson Financial’s SDC global new issue database, 
Dealogic’s Equityware, and news searches. Due to crosslistings, some 
companies go public outside their home country. The figure shows initial 
IPO returns by country of listing. Aftermarket trading prices are mostly from 
Datastream, with missing data hand filled from news searches. Between 
1990 and 2003, 4,079 IPOs were completed in the 19 countries shown in 
the figure. This breaks down as follows: Austria (83), Belgium (102), 
Denmark (69), Finland (70), France (679), Germany (583), Greece (301), 
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Hungary (54), Ireland (22), Italy (158), Luxembourg (5), Netherlands (77), 
Norway (167), Poland (214), Portugal (33), Spain (47), Sweden (180), 
Switzerland (68), and the United Kingdom (1,167).  
 
Graph 7. IPO Returns in Asia-Pacific and Latin America: 1990-2001 
 
Source: Ljungqvist, 2005 
 
The figure reports equal-weighted average initial IPO returns in % for eight 
Asian-Pacific and eight countries, calculated as the aftermarket trading 
price over the IPO offer price less one. Aftermarket trading prices are 
measured on the first day of trading. IPOs are identified by the author using 
a range of sources including national stock exchanges, Thomson 
Financial’s SDC global new issue database, Dealogic’s Equityware, and 
news searches. Due to cross-listings, some companies go public outside 
their home country. The figure shows initial IPO returns by country of 
listing. Aftermarket trading prices are mostly from Datastream, with missing 
data hand filled from news searches. Between 1990 and 2001, 2,716 IPOs 
were completed in the 16 countries shown in the figure. This breaks down 
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as follows: Australia (633), Hong Kong (523), Indonesia (213), Malaysia 
(506), New Zealand (51), Philippines (91), Singapore (313), Thailand (251), 
Argentina (25), Barbados (1), Brazil (13), Chile (7), Colombia (3), Mexico 
(79), Uruguay (1), and Venezuela (6). 
Table 3. IPO Underpricing Country Studies 
Country n period (19..-19..) Underpricing rate 
Australia 266 76-89 11,9 
Belgium 28 84-90 10,2 
Brazil 62 79-90 78,5 
Canada 258 71-92 5,4 
Chili 19 82-90 16,3 
Finland 85 84-92 9,6 
France 187 83-92 4,2 
Germany 172 78-92 11,1 
Greece 79 87-91 48,5 
Holland 72 82-91 7,2 
Hong Kong 80 80-90 17,6 
India 98 92-93 35,3 
Italy 75 85-91 27,1 
Japan 472 70-91 32,5 
Korea 347 80-90 78,1 
Malaysia 132 80-91 80,3 
Mexico 37 87-90 33,0 
New Zealand 149 79-87 28,8 
Portugal 62 86-87 54,4 
Singapore 128 73-92 31,4 
Spain 71 85-90 35,0 
Swiss 42 83-89 35,8 
Switzerland 213 70-91 39,0 
Thailand 32 88-89 58,1 
Taiwan 168 71-90 45,0 
United Kingdom 2133 59-90 12,0 
USA 10.626 60-92 15,3 
Source: Ibbotson, R., Ritter, J., Initial Public Offerings. 
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There are 16093 IPOs in table related to 27 different markets. In most of 
the studies the underpricing is calculated as the return on first day closing 
price with respect to IPO price. However some of them use the first week 
closing price. Besides some studies uses the market adjusted returns and 
some uses the raw returns. But the important thing is that no matter the 
calculation is there exits underpricing phenomenon in both the developed 
and the developing countries. The underpricing changes between 80.3 and 
4.2%.  There are many more studies investigating the underpricing which 
are not listed on this table. 
 51
ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE 
4.2 Statistics about IPOs in ISE 
Before starting the analysis of IPO anomalies at the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, I would like to give some important statistics on IPOs to give an 
idea of the periods and the market. 
Table 4. Number of Companies at the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
 LISTED COMPANIES LISTED ETF's 
NUMBER OF COMPANIES/ETF's 
TRADED ON THE ISE MARKETS 
 Number of  
Nominal 
Value  
Nominal 
Value       Other 
 Companies  of Shares  of Shares National     Comp
   ('000 YTL) ETF's ('000 YTL) Market   TOTAL  ETF's (*) 
1986 350   795   80   80     
1987 414   1,613   82   82     
1988 556   3,132   79   79     
1989 730   6,727   76   76     
1990 916   14,476   110   110     
1991 1,092   32,304   134   134     
1992 1,238   49,139   145   145     
1993 1,284   71,286   160   160     
1994 1,204   109,239   176   176     
1995 922   223,804   193   205     
1996 788   424,531   213   228     
1997 743   909,295   244   258     
1998 686   1,885,946   262   277     
1999 319   3,615,344   256   285     
2000 287   6,276,522   287   315     
2001 278   9,959,472   279   310     
2002 262   12,408,716   262   288    13  
2003 265   16,515,936   264   285    13  
2004 275   24,379,916   274   297    10  
2005 282   31,243,840  2  51,200  282   304   2  12  
Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange 
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Table 5 shows the number of companies that are listed and traded in the 
ISE markets. As mentioned before, being listed on the exchange did not 
neccessarily mean that the companies’ shares were traded in the 
Exchange. Therefore the number of listed companies was so much higher 
than the traded number, especially in 1990s. After 1999 due to a change in 
the regulation those firms began to be delisted and the number of the listed 
firms fell dramatically in 2000 below the number of traded ones. The reason 
for it was that the companies except the national market are not listed but 
traded in the exchange. Table gives the number of IPOs starting form 1990. 
As seen form the table, the greatest number of IPOs were in years 1990 
and 2000 with 35 and 36 firms respectively. Due to the financial crisis in 
Turkey the greatest number of delisting was in 2001 and 2002. Also the 
period between 2001 and 2003 had very few IPOs. The total number of 
IPOs in those three years was only seven. 
Table 5. The Number of Companies Listed and De-Listed 
  LISTED                           DE-LISTED  
Year 
  
Initial Public 
Offering 
Merger 
Acquisition Other Total 
Acquired by a 
Listed Comp. 
De-
Listed  Other Total 
Net 
Change 
1990  35 -- -- 35 -- 10 -- 10 25  
1991  24 -- -- 24 -- -- -- -- 24  
1992  13 -- -- 13 -- 2 -- 2 11  
1993  17 -- -- 17 -- 2 -- 2 15  
1994  25 -- -- 25 -- 9 -- 9 16  
1995  30 -- -- 30 -- 1 -- 1 29  
1996  25 -- -- 25 1 1 -- 2 23  
1997  31 -- -- 31 1 -- -- 1 30  
1998  20 -- -- 20 1 -- -- 1 19  
1999  9 1 -- 10 2 -- -- 2 8  
2000  36 -- -- 36 4 2 -- 6 30  
2001  1 -- -- 1 1 5 -- 6 (5) 
2002  4 1 -- 5 3 11 13 27 (22) 
2003  2 -- 2 4 2 3 2 7 (3) 
2004  12 1 -- 13 1 -- -- 1 12  
2005  9 -- 1 10 -- -- 3 3 7  
Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange 
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The below graphs give the specifications of the variable which is widely 
used in the explanation of underpricing.  
Graph 8.  IPOs Offer Rate (1990-2005) 
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Graphs 8 gives the IPOs offer rates’ mean and median values with respect 
to years. However as the graph contains all IPOs including the investment 
companies which has naturally very high offering rates it is better to look at 
the histogram. 
Graph 9. Histogram of Offer Rate 
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In the histogram of IPO offering rates it can be seen that 70% of the sample 
is between 5%-20% and most at 15%. The reason for it is the legal 
arrangements that the companies should offer at least 15% except some 
special cases.  
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of IPOs Revenues (1990-2005) 
 
# of 
IPOs Min Max Mean Median Total Revenue
1990 28 0 336,996,611 32,984,002 11,710,511 923,552,054
1991 20 863,560 146,119,378 18,566,505 7,162,704 371,330,104
1992 10 428,773 21,810,587 7,023,453 4,536,419 70,234,529
1993 13 380,420 25,339,936 11,151,643 9,616,962 144,971,364
1994 24 1,770,283 39,412,158 10,915,052 7,806,568 261,961,242
1995 26 255,880 45,342,510 9,247,547 6,070,965 240,436,211
1996 19 150,497 27,416,186 6,118,393 4,053,984 116,249,466
1997 28 917,603 182,063,385 14,839,345 7,215,099 415,501,649
1998 17 1,366,379 93,550,591 21,101,401 4,628,139 358,723,815
1999 7 414,220 56,964,711 12,331,747 4,135,709 86,322,228
2000 35 848,163 1,780,308,941 79,489,721 16,438,734 2,782,140,231
2001 1 242,654 242,654 242,654 242,654 242,654
2002 4 2,513,354 21,152,156 14,116,840 16,400,924 56,467,358
2003 1 2,717,532 2,717,532 2,717,532 2,717,532 2,717,532
2004 12 1,740,542 172,001,947 30,153,144 10,284,048 361,837,731
2005 5 0 214,186,635 88,388,372 24,567,610 441,941,858
Source: Calculated from ISE data 
4.3 Underpricing in ISE 
The first calculation on the underpricing at the ISE is the simple return 
calculated from the first day closing price after IPO and the IPO price. This 
is one of the most common ways for calculating IPO underpricing in the 
literature. The other way is calculating the log return from the above 
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mentioned variables. Both of the calculations were done in this study. 
Some studies use the first week return instead of the first day.  
The formulations of these returns are as follows. 
The calculation of the first day return is  
t: first day in the secondary market  
t-1: IPO date 
P: Price of stock 
i: IPO index number 
Rit: first day return for the IPO ”i” at time ”t” , 
 ),     ( x 
P
PPR
it
itit
ti 1100
1
1
−
−−=  
Some of the IPOs have more than one offer price or a range of prices. In 
determining the IPO offer price in these situations, I divided the total 
revenue by the number of shares offered to find the average IPO price. In 
other where there is only one price, the number is taken directly and all the 
simple returns were calculated using formula 1. 
The average of the returns is calculated by, 
,21
1
)     (R/nAR
n
i
itt ∑
=
=    
The other mainly used variable is the adjusted retrun which is calculated by 
the extracting the market retrun on the first trading day of IPO from the 
return calculated by formula 1. In the calculation of the market return, again 
formula 1 is used.  
 56
Rit: first day return for the IPO ”i” at time ”t” , 
RMit: Retrun of the market at the first day for the IPO ”i” at time ”t” , 
ARit: Adjusted return for the IPO ”i” at time ”t” , 
ARit = Rit - RMit,    ( 3 ),  
The period is 1990-2005, having a total number of 250 IPOs 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics on IPO First Day Raw Returns (1990-2005) 
 
# of 
IPOs Mean Median
Sample 
Var Kurt. Skew. Range Min Max 
Conf 
(95%) 
1990 28 0.290 0.044 0.275 8.205 2.642 2.433 -0.100 2.333 0.203
1991 20 0.037 0.043 0.010 1.015 0.491 0.421 -0.121 0.300 0.048
1992 10 0.057 0.038 0.003 1.169 1.267 0.180 0.000 0.180 0.040
1993 13 0.123 0.107 0.017 10.138 2.943 0.549 -0.018 0.531 0.078
1994 24 0.048 0.075 0.008 -0.414 -0.315 0.338 -0.107 0.231 0.038
1995 26 0.155 0.158 0.101 13.298 3.076 1.800 -0.300 1.500 0.128
1996 19 0.089 0.028 0.014 -1.860 0.228 0.295 -0.058 0.237 0.056
1997 28 0.104 0.069 0.131 22.717 4.538 2.041 -0.177 1.864 0.140
1998 17 0.077 0.081 0.013 -1.543 0.151 0.325 -0.094 0.231 0.058
1999 7 0.163 0.220 0.007 -0.642 -0.899 0.216 0.016 0.232 0.080
2000 35 0.082 0.065 0.011 -0.897 0.027 0.385 -0.150 0.235 0.036
2001 1 0.048 0.048         
2002 4 -0.039 -0.051 0.017 0.710 0.523 0.312 -0.183 0.130 0.208
2003 1 0.081 0.081         
2004 12 0.017 -0.018 0.014 -0.150 0.485 0.398 -0.179 0.219 0.076
2005 5 0.054 0.062 0.003 -1.224 -0.136 0.144 -0.019 0.125 0.071
 
Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics of the first day simple raw returns 
during the 1990-2005 period. In order to see the underprcing mean and 
median of the returns are given in graph 10. As seen from the graph except 
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2002, in all years there was underpricing at the ISE. 2002 was the only year 
that has negative mean and median which indicates an overpricing. The 
huge difference in median and mean in year 1990 is due to two outliers. 
Graph 10. Mean and Median of IPOs’ First Day Simple Raw Returns 
(1990-2005) 
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics on IPO First Day Adjusted Returns 
(1990-2005) 
 
# of 
IPOs Mean Median 
Sample 
Var Kurtosis Skew. Min Max 
1990 28 0.278 0.043 0.272 8.115 2.628 -0.108 2.308 
1991 20 0.036 0.039 0.012 0.724 0.250 -0.180 0.295 
1992 10 0.037 0.022 0.003 -0.108 0.704 -0.038 0.140 
1993 13 0.120 0.095 0.018 9.817 2.906 -0.024 0.545 
1994 24 0.054 0.062 0.009 0.334 -0.670 -0.189 0.217 
1995 26 0.166 0.148 0.100 12.652 2.990 -0.297 1.490 
1996 19 0.084 0.031 0.013 -1.675 0.270 -0.067 0.261 
1997 28 0.110 0.068 0.132 22.496 4.514 -0.181 1.874 
1998 17 0.082 0.048 0.012 -1.449 0.182 -0.073 0.234 
1999 7 0.160 0.179 0.011 -0.539 -0.229 -0.001 0.297 
2000 35 0.076 0.064 0.013 -0.918 0.134 -0.136 0.265 
2001 1 0.009 0.009    0.009 0.009 
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2002 4 -0.021 -0.033 0.013 1.575 0.637 -0.146 0.128 
2003 1 0.099 0.099    0.099 0.099 
2004 12 0.024 -0.018 0.015 -0.224 0.382 -0.189 0.224 
2005 5 0.067 0.065 0.003 -2.775 0.056 0.009 0.126 
 
Descriptive Stats of All Sample 
 SIMPRET LOGRET ADJRET 
 Mean  0.086737  0.072543  0.086842 
 Median  0.067000  0.065000  0.058000 
 Maximum  1.864000  1.052000  1.874000 
 Minimum -0.300000 -0.357000 -0.297000 
 Std. Dev.  0.181633  0.139239  0.183153 
 Skewness  4.419938  1.830805  4.387064 
 Kurtosis  40.08975  13.30977  39.59233 
 Jarque-Bera  14961.96  1231.899  14572.83 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Observations  247  247  247 
 
The histogram of the whole sample both for simple and log returns are 
given in graph 11. The distribution is left skewed and also leptocurtic 
(control et). Many of the observations are between 5%-23%. There are 
outliers in the sample which even exceeds 100%. In some of the 
calculations afterwards, these outliers will be excluded from the sample. 
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Graph 11. Histogram of First Day Returns of IPOs 
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Graph 12. Histogram of First Day Returns of IPOs (without outliers) 
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The bin range of the outlier extracted histogram shows that most of the 
returns are at 10%.  
In order to see the pattern of underpricing in time, the sample was divided 
into three groups containing 5 years. Graph 13 gives the histogram of each 
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group. The peak point of the three histograms is about 15%. Below the 
graph, the descriptive statistics of each group are given. When the outliers 
are excluded, the mean has a decreasing pattern.  
Graph 13. 5 Year Period Histogram 
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Descriptive Statistics for 5 Year Period 
Excl. outliers      
 Mean median n variance min max 
1990-1994 0.092 0.057 93 0.029 -0.121 0.750 
1995-1999 0.096 0.084 96 0.037 -0.300 1.500 
2000-2005 0.057 0.053 58 0.012 -0.183 0.235 
       
All sample      
 Mean median n variance min max 
1990-1994 0.128 0.071 95 0.097 -0.121 2.333 
1995-1999 0.114 0.085 97 0.069 -0.300 1.864 
2000-2005 0.057 0.053 58 0.012 -0.183 0.235 
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Test for Equality of Means Between Series 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Method df Value Probability 
Anova F-statistic (2, 247) 1.429116 0.2415 
     
Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between 2 0.190368 0.095184 
Within 247 16.45100 0.066603 
Total 249 16.64137 0.066833 
     
Category Statistics 
    Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
YEARS90_94 95 0.128384 0.311786 0.031989 
YEARS95_99 97 0.114106 0.262952 0.026699 
YEARS2000_05 58 0.057500 0.108856 0.014293 
All 250 0.106399 0.258520 0.016350 
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Method df Value Probability  
Med. Chi-square 2 2.569716 0.2767  
Adj. Med. Chi-square 2 2.056346 0.3577  
Kruskal-Wallis 2 2.250962 0.3245  
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 2 2.254088 0.3240  
van der Waerden 2 2.517769 0.2840  
 
Category Statistics 
   > Overall   
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
YEARS90_94 95 0.071429 48 125.6684 0.036944
YEARS95_99 97 0.085366 53 132.1340 0.070569
YEARS2000_05 58 0.053302 24 114.1293 -0.176924
All 250 0.071366 125 125.5000 0.000373
 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Method df Value Probability 
Bartlett 2 58.93132 0.0000 
Levene (2, 247) 1.850748 0.1593 
Brown-Forsythe (2, 247) 1.141493 0.3210 
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Category Statistics 
   Mean Abs. Mean Abs. 
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. 
YEARS90_94 95 0.311786 0.155156 0.138131 
YEARS95_99 97 0.262952 0.141582 0.138428 
YEARS2000_05 58 0.108856 0.086939 0.086884 
All 250 0.258520 0.134063 0.126357 
 
According to the tests for the equality of means, medians and variances in 
the three periods, it is statistically true that all these variables has a 
decreasing pattern.  
Table 9. Money Left on the Table at the IPOs in the ISE 
   Money left on the table 
 Number of IPOs Mean First Day Return Mean Aggregate 
1990 28 0.290 3,302,490 92,469,730 
1991 20 0.037 473,546 9,470,918 
1992 10 0.057 247,715 2,477,151 
1993 13 0.123 1,007,311 13,095,048 
1994 24 0.048 417,688 10,024,506 
1995 26 0.155 774,221 20,129,759 
1996 19 0.089 497,714 9,456,560 
1997 28 0.104 1,323,016 37,044,453 
1998 17 0.077 1,164,339 19,793,757 
1999 7 0.163 2,717,875 19,025,123 
2000 35 0.082 5,285,699 184,999,477 
2001 1 0.048 11,555 11,555 
2002 4 -0.039 -1,085,970 -4,343,881 
2003 1 0.081 219,156 219,156 
2004 12 0.017 -186,928 -2,243,133 
2005 5 0.054 6,135,440 30,677,202 
Total    442,307,379 
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Table 10. Sectorial Breakdown of IPOs and Underpricing 
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Number 
of IPOs 1 132 4 1 18 3 6 73 9
Min 1.61 -17.7 -6.2 150.0 -10.0 -10.0 -18.3 -30.0 -3.1
Max 1.61 134.3 22.1 150.0 70.0 22.6 21.9 233.3 23.5
Median 1.61 6.9 14.9 150.0 6.7 10.9 -11.5 8.3 1.6
First Day 
Raw 
Return 
Mean 1.61 9.6 11.5 150.0 10.8 7.9 -6.5 12.8 5.9
Min 29 0 15 15 0 5 15 4 15
Max 29 100 20 15 55 30 35 99 41
Median 29 16 16 15 24 15 16 25 20
Free Float 
Rate 
Mean 29 20 17 15 26 17 20 38 24
 
4.4 Long Run Underperformance of IPOs in ISE 
In the calculation of the long run performance of IPOs 4 variables which are 
widely used in most of the studies are calculated as suggested by Ritter 
(1991).  
The first one is the average of market adjusted returns calculated by 
formula 3.  
,1 4
1
)     (AR/nAAR
n
i
itit ∑
=
=  
The second one is the cumulative adjusted return which is defined as CAR 
and is the sum of the average adjusted returns. 
,5
1
1 )     (AARCAR
s
t
t,s ∑
=
=  
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The third calculation is the compound return calculated by formula 6.  
,611
1
)     ()r(R
n
t
iti ∏
=
−+=  
In formula 6, rit  is the return for IPO “i” in month “t” and describes the “buy 
and hold” strategy return. For the calculation of this strategy’s return with 
respect to the market, another variable named “wealth relative” WR is used 
as calculated by formula 7.  
,7
1
1 )     (WR
t the markereturn forhree year  average t
for stockld return buy and hohree year  average t
+
+=  
If WR is greater than 1, it means that the IPO return for 36 months is 
greater than that of the markets. Oppositely, if WR is smaller than 1 the 
market out performs the IPO.  
Graph 14. Long-Term Market Adjusted Returns of IPOs 
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Graph 14 shows the IPOs’ market adjusted returns in the long run 
calculated by using formula 4. In the graph t=0 is the first day return of the 
IPO. This return is calculated by formula 1 and 3.  
The graph consists 128 IPOs in the period. The first day average market 
adjusted return for this sample is 7%. In the secondary market the market 
adjusted returns fell. In the secondary market the return from the second 
trading day closing with respect to the first trading day closing price is about 
1.4%. In other words the first day return of the secondary market is very 
small compared to the first day return of IPOs mentioned before. After the 
first day, the market adjusted returns are generally negative in the first 
month.  
Making the calculations by using weekly and monthly data we can see 
more clearly that the market adjusted returns are negative. This is shown in 
graph 15. For weekly and monthly conversion 5 and 21 days are used.  
Graph 15. Weekly Market Adjusted Returns of IPOs 
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The first week has  the lowest weekly adjusted return among 50 weeks. 
Considering that the fourth week is very slightly positive, we can conclude 
that the adjusted returns in the first 5 weeks after the IPO, are negative. 
Besides there are only a few weeks that have positive values. 
Cumulative Adjusted Returns of IPOs  
Graph 16 gives the CAR values of IPOs using formula 5. 
Graph 16. Cumulative Adjusted Returns for 500 Days 
 
The CAR value becomes negative approximately after 1 month and 
remains negative after 50 days. The total CAR for 500 days is about -16%.  
After calculating buy and hold returns WR values are calculated by formula 
7. 
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Table 11. Wealth Relatives of IPOs 
T:  # months N: observations Percentage Average 
T: 36 181    
>1 67 37,02 All 1,12 
>2 18 9,94 >2 excl. 0,83 
>3 6 3,31 >3 Excl. 0,95 
>4 3 1,66   
>5 0 0,00   
T: 48 104   
>1 44 42,31 All 2 
>2 17 16,35 >2 Excl. 0,83 
>3 7 6,73 >3 Excl. 1,00 
>4 5 4,81   
>5 3 2,88   
T:36 131  
>1 49 37,40 All 1,19 
>2 17 12,98 >2 Excl. 0,80 
>3 6 4,58 >3 Excl. 0,95 
>4 3 2,29   
>5 2 1,53   
T: 24 154   
>1 53 34,42 All 1,10 
>2 14 9,09 >2 Excl. 0,88 
>3 6 3,90 >3 Excl. 0,96 
>4 3 1,95   
>5 1 0,65   
T: 12 181   
>1 67 37,02 All 1,02 
>2 6 3,31 >2 Excl. 0,96 
>3 2 1,10 >3 Excl. 0,99 
>4 0 0,00   
>5 0 0,00   
 
The table contains data for 1990-1998 period with 181 IPOs. The first 
column of the table gives the number of months used in the calculations. 
WR is calculated for 48, 36 24 12 moths respectively. As there are a few 
outers which have very high WR values, calculations are also done with 
excluding these outliers. When outliers are excluded the WR value for all 
calculations are below 1. There are 2 IPOs with a WR value more than 6 
and 3% of the all sample have WR values greater than 3 and 10% greater 
than 2. The WR value for the rest of the sample is below 1 and 0.85.  
These findings show that the first day return or underpricing is high but the 
IPOs under performance the market in the long run. The findings are 
consistent with the findings in literature.  
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Table 12. WR Values for Main Sectors 
 all <1 >1 >2 >3 >2 excl. >3 excl. 
N 116 75 41 10 3 106 113 
Manufacturing 
Industry WR 0,998 0,579 1,767 2,892 3,936 0,820 0,921 
N 15 6 9 4 2 11 13 Wholesale And 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels And 
Restaurants WR 2,144 0,529 3,221 5,656 8,716 0,867 1,134 
N 3 2 1 1 0 2 3 Transportation, 
Communication 
And Storage WR 1,567 0,875 2,953 2,953 --- 0,875 1,567 
N 27 18 9 2 0 25 27 
Financial 
Institutions WR 0,944 0,655 1,524 2,508 --- 0,819 0,944 
 
The table gives the sectorial breakdown of WR with respect to main sectors 
in Istanbul Stock Exchange. However the sectors with inadequate number 
of IPOs are not in the table. WR values are calculated for different 
thresholds. The last two columns gives the values without outliers. 
Considering all IPOs the Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants sector has the greatest WR value. Nine out of 16 IPOs in this 
sector outperformed the market in the long run with an average 3.2 WR 
value. However when IPOs having WR values greater than 2 are excluded 
from the sample the average WR is below 1. The only sector that has WR 
value greater than 1 even when the outliers (WR>2) are excluded is the 
Holding and Investment Companies..  
Also WR values for the sub sectors are calculated and given in the tables 
below. Most of the sub-sectors also have WR values below 1. 
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Table 13. Manufacturing Industry Sub-Sectorial WR Values 
 all <1 >1 >2 >3 >2 excl. >3 excl.
N 15 10 5 2 2 13 13 Food, Beverage And 
Tobacco 
WR 1,148 0,539 2,366 4,189 4,189 0,680 0,680 
N 32 29 3 2 0 30 32 Textile, Wearing Apparel 
And Leather Industries 
WR 0,745 0,561 2,519 2,784 --- 0,609 0,745 
N 8 7 1 0 0 8 8 Wood Products Including 
Furniture 
WR 0,719 0,584 1,671 --- --- 0,719 0,719 
N 14 6 8 3 0 11 14 Chemicals and Of Chemical 
Petroleum, Rubber And 
Plastic Products WR 1,274 0,617 1,768 2,327 --- 0,987 1,274 
N 16 7 9 1 0 15 16 Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 
WR 1,216 0,707 1,611 2,446 --- 1,133 1,216 
N 6 3 3 0 0 6 6 
Basic Metal Industries 
WR 0,944 0,614 1,273 --- --- 0,944 0,944 
N 21 11 10 2 1 19 20 Fabricated Metal Products, 
Machinery And Equipment 
WR 1,075 0,545 1,658 2,773 3,428 0,896 0,957 
N 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 Other Manufacturing 
Industry 
WR 0,729 0,729 --- --- --- 0,729 0,729 
 
Table 14. Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants Sub-
Sectorial WR Values  
<1 >1 >2 >3 >2 excl. >3 excl.
N 5 1 4 1 0 4 5 
Wholesale Trade 
WR 1,238 0,733 1,364 2,258 --- 0,983 1,238 
N 7 2 5 3 2 4 5 
Consumer Trade 
WR 3,444 0,286 4,707 6,789 8,716 0,935 1,336 
N 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 
Restaurants and hotels 
WR 0,623 0,623 --- --- --- 0,623 0,623 
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Table 15. Financial Institutions Sub-Sectrial WR Values  
 <1 >1 >2 >3 >2 excl. >3 excl.
N 11 5 6 2 0 9 11 
Banks and Special Finance 
Corporations WR 1,178 0,653 1,616 2,508 --- 0,883 1,178 
N 7 6 1 0 0 7 7 
Insurance Companies 
WR 0,762 0,675 1,283 --- --- 0,762 0,762 
N 9 7 2 0 0 9 9 
Financial Leasing and 
Factoring Companies WR 0,800 0,638 1,370 --- --- 0,800 0,800 
N 6 3 3 0 0 6 6 
Holding and Investment 
Companies WR 1,017 0,622 1,411 --- --- 1,017 1,017 
N 12 9 3 0 0 12 12 
Investment trusts 
WR 0,837 0,620 1,485 --- --- 0,837 0,837 
 
Analysis for 1998-2003 Period 
As mentioned before the long run performance is usually calculated for 3 
years period. Therefore the IPOs after 2003 are not taken into analysis. 
Also when we take all the IPOs in the 1990-2003 period the sample 
becomes meaningless. As almost all the firms will be considered as IPO. 
Therefore the sample is divided into two sub periods. The analysis 
afterwards is for the 1998-2003 period. 
Graph 17. Histogram of First Day Raw Returns (1998-2003) 
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The graph consists 43 IPOs and shows that the underpricing anomaly is 
still valid in ISE. The average underprcing is 8.74%. Six IPOs have 
negative first day returns or in other words overpriced.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 8,74  <0 6 
Standard Error 1,60  =0 7 
Median 7,93  >0 30 
Standard Deviation 10,54
Kurtosis 0,54
Skewness 0,66
Minimum -11,52
Maximum 41,38
 
Graph 18. Daily Market Adjusted Returns 
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Graph 19. Daily CAR Values 
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 1. month 2. month 3. month 4. month 
CAR 7,843 3,853 0,277 -3,884 
 
CAR values turn to negative after 4 months. In the 1990-1998 sample it 
was only one month. 
Wealth relative values are given on an annual basis in the table. Taking all 
firms in the calculation the average WR is above 1, but when 5 outliers are 
excluded it decrease below 1.  
Table 16. WR Values for 1998-2003 
 <1 >1 average n 
1998 9 6 1,041 15 
1999 3 6 1,126 9 
2000 16 15 1,273 31 
2002 3 0 0,595 3 
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Until now the performances of IPOs are calculated with respect to the ISE 
market. In other words ISE market main index was the benchmark. 
However in some studies in the literature it is mentioned that the 
performance can change when the benchmarks are changed. Therefore I 
will make another calculation with a control group as suggested in some 
articles.  
I choosed the manufacturing industry as the number of IPOs in this sector 
is enough to make two groups. There are 185 firms in the sample which 95 
of them went public 1992 and 93 after. The first one is the control group 
and the second one is the test group. In order to compare the 
performances of these groups an index based on market capitalization is 
computed.  
As done in most of the index calculations when a new firm is added to the 
group the base value of the index is changed.  
The formulation of the index is as follows: 
t: new firm trading date 
AI: the percentage of the total market capitalization due to the new firm 
TMC: total market capitalization 
MCt: market capitalization before time t 
TMC = MCt * AI  
Later the index is converted that 1992=1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75
 
 
Graph 20. Performance Comparison of IPOS With Respect To The 
Control Group 
 
Control group is defined as CG in the graph. As seen, IPOs 
underperformed both the control group and ISE. The performance of the 
control group is very close to that of the ISE. However the small graph 
helps us see the performances of all groups in 1992-95 period.  
Another calculation is the correlation matrix for the variables calculated.  
One of the important finding due to the correlation matrix is that both the 
first day raw return or underpricing and the adjusted return is negatively 
correlated with three years raw and adjusted returns. In other words as 
underpricing increases the long run underperformance is higher. This 
finding is consistent with the impresio hypothesis which was explained 
earlier. 
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Table 17. Correlation Matrix of Variables 
 return Adj. ret 1.day 1.week 1.mon. 2.mon. 3.mon. 1.year 2.year 3.year 1.week 1.mon. 2.mon. 3.mon. 1.year 2.year 3.year 
return 1    
Adj. ret 0,969 1    
1.day 0,368 0,461 1    
1.week 0,052 0,070 0,192 1    
1.mon. 0,032 0,023 -0,088 -0,122 1    
2.mon. 0,101 0,102 0,151 0,211 -0,051 1    
3.mon. -0,131 -0,102 -0,128 0,043 -0,034 0,042 1    
1.year 0,110 0,073 -0,167 -0,069 0,069 -0,142 -0,289 1    
2.year 0,055 0,041 -0,018 -0,152 0,090 -0,131 -0,022 0,091 1    
3.year -0,187 -0,134 -0,056 -0,042 0,224 0,003 0,339 0,042 0,164 1    
1.week 0,362 0,420 0,687 0,530 -0,079 0,292 0,005 -0,110 -0,120 0,024 1    
1.mon. 0,386 0,396 0,528 0,325 0,137 0,192 -0,082 -0,033 -0,034 0,008 0,709 1    
2.mon. 0,353 0,367 0,487 0,383 0,088 0,398 -0,072 -0,072 -0,113 0,003 0,695 0,790 1    
3.mon. 0,372 0,398 0,437 0,393 0,033 0,446 0,032 -0,050 -0,153 0,023 0,675 0,692 0,926 1    
1.year 0,111 0,091 0,164 0,209 0,058 0,277 0,149 -0,057 -0,105 -0,063 0,357 0,272 0,447 0,540 1   
2.year -0,111 -0,119 0,176 0,228 0,158 0,233 0,085 -0,103 -0,055 0,237 0,351 0,196 0,444 0,459 0,642 1  
3.year -0,330 -0,312 0,079 0,379 0,217 0,232 -0,006 -0,016 -0,020 0,216 0,267 0,054 0,304 0,275 0,445 0,798 1 
 
4.5 Regression Analysis 
The analysis until this section proves that there is underpricing and long run 
underperformance in the ISE. However the reasons are not clear, or in 
other words the factors that cause these anomalies are not determined. In 
this section I will try to find these factors by the regression analysis. I used 
the all sample in the first regressions and then I substracted the outliers 
and at the last one I subtracted the investment companies from the sample.  
I started with the following model. 
logret = C + β1 dummy10 + β2 mon_avr + β3 ln_invest + β4Rate + β5 lnrev + 
β6 sales_abroad + β7 timlelag + β8 ownership dummy + β9 ln_nomval +      
β10 dummyinv_comp + β11 salesmet_dum 
 
I used two different models. In the first model log returns are taken as the 
independent variable. In the second I used adjusted returns. The 
dependent variables are as follows: 
dummy10: If there is a group of investors or individual investors that bought 
more than %10, the dummy is 1.  
mon_avr: The average market return of the week or the month before the 
IPO.  
ln_invest: ln of the total number of investors in the IPO 
rate: IPO offering rate  
lnrev: the ln of the total revenue of IPO 
sales_abroad: the rate of the sales to foreign investors or (abroad) 
timelag: number of the days between the IPO and first day trading in he 
market  
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ownership dummy: dummy for the public companies. 
ln_nomval: ln of the nominal value of the shares of the IPO 
dummyinv_comp: dummy for investment funds. 
(At the same time this dummy can be used as the underwriter method 
dummy as most of the investment funds’ underwriting method is best effort) 
salesmet_dum : dummy for the sales method (1 for sales at ISE) 
For the log return as the independent variable, after extracting statistically 
insignificant variables one by one I reached the following model. 
Dependent Variable: LOG_RET 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 146 
Included observations: 146 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DUMMY10 -5.361546 2.407396 -2.227114 0.0276 
DUMMYINV_COMP 9.554104 3.122733 3.059533 0.0027 
LN_INVEST 2.097556 0.700303 2.995211 0.0033 
LNREV -2.920801 1.148480 -2.543188 0.0121 
MON_AVR 5.090528 1.368995 3.718441 0.0003 
SALESMET_DUM 14.05613 4.186189 3.357739 0.0010 
TIMELAG 0.085632 0.012849 6.664417 0.0000 
SALES_ABROAD 0.123688 0.052047 2.376455 0.0189 
C 29.92728 15.10250 1.981612 0.0495 
R-squared 0.439380     Mean dependent var 7.346314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.406643     S.D. dependent var 15.71006 
S.E. of regression 12.10141     Akaike info criterion 7.884183 
Sum squared resid 20062.84     Schwarz criterion 8.068104 
Log likelihood -566.5453     F-statistic 13.42153 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.082240     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Although the prob-values of t statistics and F-statistic are statistically 
significant due to multicollineraity problems with respect to the condition 
index which is not given here, the model is rebuilt as follows. 
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Model Summary
.475a .225 .220 13.8758
.558b .312 .302 13.1238
.592c .350 .337 12.7952
.613d .376 .358 12.5867
.631e .399 .377 12.3970
Model
1
2
3
4
5
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), TIMELAGa. 
Predictors: (Constant), TIMELAG, MON_AVRb. 
Predictors: (Constant), TIMELAG, MON_AVR,
dummyinv_comp
c. 
Predictors: (Constant), TIMELAG, MON_AVR,
dummyinv_comp, salesmet_dum
d. 
Predictors: (Constant), TIMELAG, MON_AVR,
dummyinv_comp, salesmet_dum, ln_invest
e. 
 
Coefficientsa
5.941 1.169 5.084 .000
.089 .014 .475 6.471 .000 .475 .475 .475 1.000 1.000
4.189 1.180 3.550 .001
.091 .013 .489 7.045 .000 .475 .508 .489 .997 1.003
6.081 1.434 .294 4.240 .000 .270 .334 .294 .997 1.003
3.087 1.212 2.548 .012
.094 .013 .505 7.429 .000 .475 .529 .502 .992 1.009
5.561 1.410 .269 3.944 .000 .270 .314 .267 .981 1.019
9.251 3.184 .199 2.905 .004 .192 .237 .197 .977 1.023
2.576 1.211 2.128 .035
.085 .013 .456 6.539 .000 .475 .482 .435 .909 1.100
5.566 1.387 .270 4.013 .000 .270 .320 .267 .981 1.019
8.232 3.161 .177 2.604 .010 .192 .214 .173 .959 1.042
9.549 3.984 .168 2.397 .018 .313 .198 .159 .906 1.104
-9.186 5.225 -1.758 .081
.089 .013 .478 6.888 .000 .475 .503 .451 .893 1.120
5.874 1.372 .284 4.280 .000 .270 .340 .280 .972 1.029
9.626 3.171 .207 3.036 .003 .192 .249 .199 .925 1.081
11.907 4.055 .209 2.937 .004 .313 .241 .192 .849 1.178
1.287 .557 .164 2.312 .022 -.061 .192 .152 .851 1.175
(Constant)
TIMELAG
(Constant)
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
(Constant)
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
dummyinv_comp
(Constant)
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
dummyinv_comp
salesmet_dum
(Constant)
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
dummyinv_comp
salesmet_dum
ln_invest
Model
1
2
3
4
5
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part
Correlations
Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: LOG_RETa. 
 
At the end of the stepwise procedure the statistically significant variables 
are as follows: timelag is useful especially for capturing outliers. Monthly 
average return of the market before the IPO has a a positive coefficient. It 
means that if the average return of the market before the month of the IPO 
is positive the underpricing is bigger. In the bull market the prices are more 
likely to go up. This may be the reason why the first day price is higher than 
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the bear market. The other statistically significant variable is the dummy for 
investment companies or at the same time dummy for the underwriter 
method. The positive coefficient implies that the underpricing at the 
investment companies is statistically bigger than the other companies. Also 
sales method dummy is significant that means that the sales at ISE have a 
higher underpricing. The last variable is the ln of the number of investors in 
the IPO. As the number of investor increases the IPO is more underpriced. 
One possible explanation of this situation is that if the price is low enough, 
more investors attend to the IPO. Alternatively we can use another variable 
for the ln_invest. We can divide the revenue of the IPO by the number of 
investors attended to the IPO. We can find the revenue per the number of 
investors. Adding this new variable the model becomes as follows. 
Dependent Variable: LOG_RET 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 146 
Included observations: 146 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TIMELAG 0.084648 0.012738 6.645196 0.0000 
MON_AVR 5.322368 1.356712 3.922991 0.0001 
DUMMYINV_COMP 8.661444 3.089623 2.803398 0.0058 
SALESMET_DUM 14.30573 4.240282 3.373769 0.0010 
LN_REVPERINV -1.894593 0.672302 -2.818069 0.0055 
C 15.91541 4.878913 3.262081 0.0014 
R-squared 0.409318     Mean dependent var 7.346314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.388222     S.D. dependent var 15.71006 
S.E. of regression 12.28782     Akaike info criterion 7.895322 
Sum squared resid 21138.67     Schwarz criterion 8.017936 
Log likelihood -570.3585     F-statistic 19.40280 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.058336     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Due to the AIC, this new varibale improves the model.  
The other variables in the general model are statistically insignificant.  
However the significant variables change when the independent variable of 
the model is taken as the adjusted return.  
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Model Summary
.689a .475 .456 16.5423
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), MON_AVR, salesmet_dum,
DUMMY10, dummyinv_comp, TIMELAG
a. 
 
Coefficientsa
5.291 2.191 2.414 .017
12.754 4.156 .192 3.068 .003 .188 .251 .188 .958 1.043
16.174 5.243 .199 3.085 .002 .366 .252 .189 .904 1.106
-5.108 2.767 -.114 -1.846 .067 -.158 -.154 -.113 .984 1.017
.144 .017 .541 8.390 .000 .580 .578 .514 .901 1.109
5.392 1.829 .183 2.948 .004 .189 .242 .181 .975 1.026
(Constant)
dummyinv_comp
salesmet_dum
DUMMY10
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part
Correlations
Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: ADJ_RETa. 
 
In the second model the dummy for 10% is negatively correlated with the 
adjusted return.  
 
 
Models for the sample excluding investment companies 
 Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .536(a) .288 .264 11.9678
a  Predictors: (Constant), MON_AVR, salesmet_dum, TIMELAG, ln_invest 
Coefficientsa
-9.721 5.333 -1.823 .071
8.353 4.308 .154 1.939 .055 .204 .173 .148 .923 1.084
1.403 .571 .194 2.457 .015 .083 .217 .188 .933 1.072
.081 .017 .373 4.762 .000 .407 .396 .364 .953 1.049
5.455 1.418 .298 3.846 .000 .295 .329 .294 .970 1.031
(Constant)
salesmet_dum
ln_invest
TIMELAG
MON_AVR
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part
Correlations
Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: LOG_RETa. 
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Models for the sample excluding outliers and investment funds 
Model Summary
.452a .205 .188 10.3548
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), MON_AVR, RATE, ln_investa. 
 
Coefficientsa
-14.093 4.778 -2.950 .004
.135 .051 .209 2.664 .009 .152 .220 .201 .919 1.088
1.725 .469 .290 3.683 .000 .196 .297 .278 .914 1.094
5.240 1.140 .349 4.598 .000 .333 .362 .347 .988 1.012
(Constant
RATE
ln_invest
MON_AV
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part
Correlations
Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: LOG_RETa. 
 
Especially market average return is significant at all models. At the last 
model offering rate and number of investors are also significant. The model 
has 0.19 adjusted R2.  
The statistics for state owned IPOs between 1990-2005 period are as 
follows. The number of such IPOs  is only  7.  
 
 
State-
owned 
comp. raw ret log return adj return IPO year 
ASELS 1 0.024 0.0235 -0.02411 1990 
PETKM 1 -0.040 -0.0408 -0.03613 1990 
THYAO 1 -0.100 -0.1054 -0.06729 1990 
PTOFS 1 0 0 0.02691 1991 
TOASO 1 0.053 0.0513 0.03618 1991 
TUPRS 1 -0.100 -0.1054 -0.07309 1991 
VANET 1 0.122 0.1153 0.12973 1998 
 V. CONCLUSION 
IPO underpricing has become a financial anomaly and has puzzled 
researchers since Stoll and Ibbotson first documented the IPO underpricing 
on the US markets at the early 70s. Many other researches about the 
underpricing in many other markets constituted a great deal of literature 
since then. The question is that, if in principal, valuing IPOs is not different 
from valuing other stocks, as the common approaches of discounted cash 
flow analysis and/or comparable firms analysis can be used, why is there a 
systematic underpricing at IPOs considering that it brings additional cost for 
the firms. In literature, many factors were analyzed for different markets 
and they usually change from time to time and from market to market. I 
tried to find the factors affecting underpricing at the ISE during the period 
1995-2005 running different regression for three different samples. Findings 
of this study show that there is underpricing and long run 
underperformance at ISE. Monthly average return of the market before the 
IPO has a positive coefficient and significant at all models. It means that if 
the average return of the market before the month of the IPO is positive the 
underpricing is higher. Dummy for investment companies or at the same 
time dummy for the underwriter method was significant at the general 
model with a positive coefficient. The positive coefficient implies that the 
underpricing at the investment companies is statistically bigger than the 
other companies. Also sales method dummy is significant which means that 
the sales at ISE have a bigger underpricing then the fixed price offer. The 
last variable is the log of the number of investors in the IPO. As the number 
of investor increases the IPO is more underpriced. 
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